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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY:
THREE PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE THE
NATIONWIDE POPULAR VOTE IN
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Alexander S. Belenky* †

Introduction
The idea of reforming the Electoral College recurs each time a presidential election nears. Polls show that an overwhelming majority of respondents
support abolishing the Electoral College in favor of direct popular election
of the President. Yet, it is doubtful whether these polls really imply that such
a move would be best for the country. Despite the seeming simplicity of
direct popular presidential election, its introduction in the United States—a
country in which the clear separation of powers between the states and the
federal government has existed for more than two centuries—would have
hidden drawbacks that the media and pollsters usually fail to communicate.
Further, the existing Electoral College-based system of electing a President
is complicated, and the simplistic media coverage of American social and
political phenomena fails to educate voters about the nuances of that system.
Thus, pollsters are asking people whether they favor replacing the Electoral
College, a system that many respondents don’t sufficiently understand, with
direct popular election, a system that many respondents also don’t necessarily understand.
Since the 2000 election, a dozen electoral reform proposals have been
discussed both in the scientific community and in the media. Five proposals
have received particular attention. I discussed two of them—one introducing
a Maine-like district scheme and the other introducing a proportional
scheme of awarding state electoral votes both in some states and nationwide—in my recent editorial in the Baltimore Sun, “District Vote Proposal
Falls Short.” This Commentary explores the other three proposals, which
are concerned with introducing the nationwide popular vote into presidential
elections.
*
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Since space limitations prevent a detailed analysis of the proposals under consideration here, this Commentary offers only a kind of a snapshot of
the basic ideas underlying each proposal, along with the inevitable negative
consequences of adopting two of the proposals. I don’t discuss how the
technical problems associated with counting every vote under direct popular
elections—for instance, voter registration fraud, long lines, and voting machine glitches—might compare to those under the existing election system.
Whatever these problems may be, the quality of services in administering
elections shouldn’t be a factor in choosing a particular scheme for electing a
President.
New election rules that I first proposed in Extreme Outcomes of US
Presidential Elections and (in a particular form) in How America Chooses
Its Presidents would encourage the country to elect a President with a mandate from both the nation and the individual states as equal members of the
Union. Under these rules, the nationwide popular vote would be a decisive
factor in choosing the President, while the existing Electoral College-based
system would be preserved as a backup. Also under these rules, all the states
would gain the attention of presidential candidates while retaining the benefits of the Electoral College.
Though I have my own preferences regarding the three proposals I discuss in this Commentary, readers should decide for themselves which
proposal merits which of the three labels that the title of this Commentary
borrows from Sergio Leone’s famous movie.
I. Direct Popular Election of a President
Implementing a direct popular election system—which has been proposed many times but always without sufficient support in Congress to
initiate a constitutional amendment—would require revolutionary changes
in the American political system.
First, American voters would acquire a constitutionally guaranteed right
to vote for President. Currently, the participation of Americans in presidential elections—even voting for presidential electors—isn’t constitutionally
guaranteed. Appointing electors by state popular vote is no more than a particular manner of appointing state electors. Constitutionally, state
legislatures can replace this particular manner with any other manner of appointing state electors, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Bush v. Gore in
2000.
Second, introducing this election system would likely invite multicandidate presidential elections in the United States. Three factors—a potentially favorable electorate, an appeal to targeted voters, and financial
resources—are crucial for non-major party candidates to emerge, and all of
these factors look favorably upon the appearance of such candidates in direct popular presidential elections.
A sizable majority of eligible voters are, in fact, up for grabs in presidential elections, particularly, for non-major party candidates. Almost
forty-five percent of all eligible voters usually do not vote in presidential
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elections, at least ten percent of the electorate are swing voters, and more
and more registered Republicans and Democrats call themselves independent. Also, under direct popular election, the constitutionally guaranteed right
to vote for President would shift the burden of voter registration to the federal government and would eliminate many currently existing obstacles to
voting in presidential elections. The winner-take-all rule would not waste
votes cast for the losers in state presidential contests—as it does under the
existing election rules. All this would contribute to encouraging people who
are currently non-voters to vote.
In 1992, Ross Perot captured almost 19% of the 55% voter turnout, i.e.
more than 10% of the whole electorate (more precisely, the voting-age
population), even without any special appeal to non-voters and despite the
manner in which his campaign was conducted. If only half of current nonvoters voted in presidential elections, they would make the group of voters
potentially favorable to non-major party candidates comparable in size to
the group of voters favorable to either of the major party candidates. Since
the major parties do not currently seem to represent non-voters in presidential elections, there is plenty of room for non-major party candidates to
appeal to both non-voters and swing voters.
Financial problems for appealing non-major party candidates also look
solvable. For example, the Internet has proven effective in fundraising for
presidential hopefuls who appeal to particular factions of voters and in organizing concerned voters. Also, self-financed political figures interested in
running as non-major party candidates are widely perceived by Americans
as independent of any particular sponsors.
If multi-candidate elections with competitive non-major party candidates
become a reality, a particular scheme for conducting multi-candidate direct
presidential elections in the country should be chosen. The two mostemployed schemes—which are based on the simple rule “choose one candidate only”—are (a) one-round elections with a popular vote plurality
winner; and (b) two-round elections with a popular majority winner and, if
no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round, a runoff between
the top two recipients of votes.
In such a politically divided country as the United States, under the first
scheme multi-candidate elections with several candidates appealing to large
factions of voters may eventually produce an election winner with less than
30% of all votes. Would the United States accept a President who more than
70% of the electorate had not chosen? In many countries employing the
second scheme, it is common for no candidate to receive a majority of votes
in the first round and for the turnout for runoff elections to be much less
than 50% of the eligible voters. If, say, less than 40% of all eligible voters
cast ballots in a U.S. runoff, would Americans accept a President finally
elected by, say, only 20% of all eligible voters?
Though there exist schemes of choosing an election winner that overcome many deficiencies of the “choose one candidate only” rule in
reflecting the wishes of voters, their introduction into possible multicandidate direct popular presidential elections in the United States (at least
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currently) could be problematic. This is especially true taking into account
that Americans have never had either a right or a chance to choose a President directly, even under this simple rule.
Third, many Americans may feel that the introduction of direct popular
presidential election would weaken the federal system of government, because an elected President may not have a mandate from the states, even in
the form currently provided by the Electoral College. Moreover, movements
supporting non-major party presidential candidates at times may result in
the emergence of new strong political parties, and many Americans believe that a multi-party political system would destabilize the country.
In the United States today, the majority of the population resides in the
largest eleven states. As a result, candidates in direct popular presidential
elections would likely campaign mainly in large, urban areas. Sparsely
populated rural states would likely be ignored by major party candidates.
Admittedly, many of these states are ignored by candidates even under the
existing election system; but sparsely populated states may eventually have
a say in the current Electoral College, especially in close elections. Currently, if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, the election will
be thrown into the House of Representatives, where each of the fifty states
casts an equal, singular vote—regardless of the size of its population—due
to the one state, one vote constitutional principle. Nothing even close to this
would exist for small states in any direct popular presidential elections.
As a result, each of the seventeen states with five or fewer electoral
votes is unlikely to surrender what it is currently entitled to under the existing election system by supporting a constitutional amendment introducing
direct popular elections. Nor would this amendment likely garner support
from current medium-sized battleground states—which draw a great deal of
attention in election campaigns under the Electoral College. In any direct
popular election, these medium-sized states would have to compete with
large, densely popular states for even less attention of the candidates than
they currently enjoy.
II. The National Popular Vote Plan
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, Robert Bennett, a prominent constitutional lawyer, proposed an idea designed to effectuate the
constitutionally guaranteed right of state legislatures to choose presidential
electors in any manner they want, making it theoretically possible to circumvent the resistance of small states to direct popular presidential
elections. This idea, described in Bennett’s book Taming the Electoral College, was later reinvented by John Koza, a prominent computer scientist, and
developed into the National Popular Vote plan described in the book Every
Vote Equal. In its current form, the National Popular Vote plan involves assembling a compact of states that together control at least 270 electoral
votes. The signatory states’ legislatures would agree to award state electoral
votes to the winner of the nationwide popular vote plurality, no matter how
each of their own states voted.
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If a sufficient number of states adopt the interstate compact, the plan is
likely to face a constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court may conclude
that while each state legislature is free to choose a manner of appointing
state electors, a group of state legislatures cannot de facto introduce a new
system of electing a President without an amendment to the Constitution—
particularly over the objection of at least one-fourth of the members of the
Union.
The plan strikes at the heart of the 1787 Great Compromise, which the
Founding Fathers reached to keep the states together as a nation. The words
of Delaware’s Gunning Bedford, Jr., to delegates from large states at the
1787 Constitutional Convention—“I do not, gentlemen, trust you”—in discussing principles of state representation in Congress serve as a reminder
about tension between the small and large states in reaching the compromise. At the Convention, large states pledged to honor (a) the Electoral
College, an “intermediate, independent Congress” with numbers of electoral
votes for small states disproportionate to the size of their population, and (b)
the one state, one vote principle both in electing a President in the House of
Representatives and in amending the Constitution.
Today, however, the fifty states and the District of Columbia (D.C.)—
rather than a college of presidential electors—choose the President. This
happens due to the winner-take-all rule coupled with the widely implied
(though not constitutionally required) obligation of presidential electors
to follow the will of the appointing power (based on the state popular
vote in forty-eight states and in D.C. and on the popular vote within each
congressional district in Maine and Nebraska). This appears to violate the
one state, one vote principle of electing a President by states, since a state’s
quota of electoral votes is based on the size of its population. Moreover,
constitutionally, the states are to elect a President through the House of
Representatives only when the Electoral College fails to do so, i.e., when no
candidate receives a majority of votes from all the appointed electors. In
addition, adopting the winner-take-all rule of awarding state electoral votes,
currently employed by forty-eight states and by D.C., has contributed to
dividing the country into two parts during election campaigns. Candidates
from the two major parties feel “safe” in a majority of states while the electoral battles take place in a remaining minority of states. As happened in
1992, 1996, and 2000, a third-party candidate may affect the election outcome by influencing electoral votes in key battleground states, and in close
elections the existing election rules may produce an outcome contrary to the
nationwide popular will.
But all this doesn’t mean that the circumvention of a substantial number
of states—signaling that the value of the Great Compromise with respect to
electing a President is no longer honored by the signatory states—can be
justified.
Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in
which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the
popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D.C. If all of the
states and D.C. were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in
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such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters
choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan).
Would the United States accept a President who wasn’t the choice of sixtysix percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? Also, this
proposal could create the appearance of “faithless” electors in the states
forming the compact. These electors may decide not to follow the nationwide popular vote if it goes against the will of the voters of their states.
Finally, implementing this plan would still not provide the electorate with
any constitutionally guaranteed right to vote in presidential elections, even
for presidential electors.
III. Election Rules Making the Nationwide Popular Vote a
Decisive Factor in Electing a President but Retaining the
Electoral College
The new election rules I have proposed would name as President the recipient of a majority of the nationwide popular vote and of the popular vote
majorities in at least twenty-six states (or in twenty-five states and D.C.) as
long as a majority of all eligible voters cast ballots in the election. This
would be true even if another candidate won the Electoral College. Only if
no candidate achieved the required majorities would the winner of at least
270 electoral votes—automatically awarded by the states and D.C. in the
manners chosen by their legislatures—become the next President. If no candidate won at least 270 electoral votes either, then the proposed election
rules would require the House of Representatives to choose a President, as
the Twelfth Amendment directs.
When more than fifty percent of all eligible voters don’t vote, choosing
a President by the nationwide popular vote seems illogical. In such cases,
either a majority of voters don’t care, or they believe that the candidates
do not deserve their votes. It this were the case, as described above, the
Electoral College and, if necessary, the House of Representatives, should
step in as protective mechanisms—backups guaranteeing that a President is
elected (or selected) as a result of the election (though, currently, the existence of such a guarantee can be questioned, as How America Chooses Its
Presidents argues). The Founding Fathers might have seen these two election mechanisms as protecting against a failure to elect a President, even if
the popular will would not be expressed or a popular consensus could not be
reached.
Of course, any state may decide that a plurality of the statewide popular
vote is sufficient to carry the state. Also, if the number of voters casting ballots in a state is too small to award state electoral votes based on the
statewide popular vote, the state legislature should retain the right to appoint
electors to the Electoral College.
These new election rules, first proposed in my books Extreme Outcomes
of US Presidential Elections and (in a particular form) How America
Chooses Its Presidents, are easy to understand by using three conceptions of
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the U.S. Presidency. First, a candidate who wins a nationwide popular vote
majority is a “President of the people.” Second, a candidate who achieves a
majority in each of at least 26 states (or in 25 states and D.C.) is a “President of the states.” Third, a candidate who achieves a majority of votes from
all the appointed electors is a “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College”—a compromise candidate in the sense of the Great
Compromise.
A candidate who garners two kinds of the voter majorities—both the nationwide and the statewide majorities in 26 states or in 25 states and
D.C.—is both a “President of the people” and a “President of the states.”
This candidate would become the next President, even if another candidate
became the “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College.” If
no candidate is both a “President of the people” and a “President of the
states,” then the existing rules would apply, such that the Electoral College
or, if necessary, the House of Representatives would have to choose the next
President.
These rules would not destroy the existing system or any of its parts.
Rather, they would build on the current system by potentially offering up a
candidate whom society would perceive as better than the “compromise”
candidate. These rules substantially differ from the Federal System Plan of
1970, and they address federalist concerns in the strongest form, since the
one state, one vote principle matters in an attempt to directly elect a President by the nation as a whole.
Certainly, only a national dialogue may detect whether a compromise
candidate—a “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College”—
is perceived by Americans as a better choice for the country than a candidate
who is both a President of the people and a President of the states. If this
were the case, there would be no need to implement the proposed new rules,
despite all the well-known deficiencies of the existing election system.
The proposed rules would encourage major party candidates to actively
campaign in all states, regardless of size. These candidates are likely to compete in all large states to win a nationwide popular majority and in small states
to seek to win in at least twenty-six states. Both candidates are likely to compete in medium-sized states as well, especially in the “battleground” ones,
since the Electoral College might eventually decide the election outcome.
These new rules would also encourage voter turnout by affording
Americans the right to vote for President while leaving state legislatures
with the right to appoint electors if their state’s voter turnout is too small.
Conclusion
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Electoral College
suggest that the Founding Fathers might have believed that new generations
of Americans would propose a better election system or at least a better
compromise in electing a President as the country developed. Such a compromise may be found in the proposed election rules under which nobody
seems to lose while all voters and states gain.

